Abstract -
INTRODUCTION
I n 1961, President Kennedy proposed ending deferral of the U.S. tax on active income of foreign subsidiaries controlled by U.S. companies (later called controlled foreign corporations, or CFCs) if the income was earned in a developed host country or was shifted to a foreign tax haven.
1 At the time, the controlled subsidiaries earned the bulk of their income in developed host countries that taxed the income at a rate close to that applied to corporate income earned in the United States (U.S. House of Representatives, 1961, p. 28) . It was noted, however, that the subsidiaries sometimes could avoid the host country taxes by shifting income to foreign tax havens.
2 Since the U.S. tax on active foreign income could be deferred indefinitely, it was feared that such tax avoidance would lead to tax-motivated foreign investment and erode the U.S. tax base.
Congress refused to eliminate the deferral for active income earned in developed countries, but it agreed to include the so-called related party rules in its new anti-deferral regime, subpart F of the Internal Revenue Code, which it enacted in 1962. These rules denied deferral of the U.S. tax for income shifted to foreign tax havens from the United States or from foreign host countries. Given the pattern of U.S. foreign investment at the time, Congress believed that the rules would provide sufficient protection against taxmotivated foreign investment eroding the U.S. tax base (see U.S. House of Representatives, 1962, pp. 57-8; U.S. Senate, 1962, pp. 78-80) . Owing to recent changes in U.S. tax regulations and innovations in tax planning, however, U.S. companies have increasingly managed to circumvent the rules that deal with income shifting from foreign host countries to foreign tax havens (the "foreign-to-foreign" related party rules).
3 When the Treasury Department responded with new tax regulations, these rules met with strong opposition in the business community and in Congress. This paper examines some of the economic issues involved in the debate over the foreign-to-foreign related party rules. It is limited, however, to the broader issue of the welfare consequences of a tax bias in favor of foreign or domestic investment income. More specifically, it reviews the economics literature to see what guidance it gives for answering the question of how limiting the deferral of the U.S. tax on active income of CFCs would affect global economic welfare. 4 
DESIGNING TAX POLICY TO PROMOTE GLOBAL WELFARE
The Basic Economic Analysis Musgrave (1963) provided the first careful study of the best way to structure taxes on international investment income when the goal is to maximize the global welfare. She used a simple model in which capital is homogeneous and is freely mobile between countries, and the volume of saving is not affected by changes in the rate of return. The logic of her analysis is compelling: an investment will be most productive if it is located where the pretax rate of return is highest. Each investor, by trying to achieve the highest after-tax rate of return, will automatically locate his investment where the pretax rate of return is highest if all investment income is taxed at the same rate. Assuming capital markets are competitive, efficient allocation of investment at the margin ensures that the greatest global income is obtained from a given stock of capital.
5 The capital-exporting country can achieve this result by following a policy of capital export neutrality; that is, by ensuring that the total rate of tax on foreign investment income (including taxes in both the home and host countries) is the same as the tax rate on domestic investment income.
Modifying the Basic Analysis-Adding Variable Saving
This basic analysis has been modified to incorporate a number of complicating 3 The primary innovation in tax planning by U.S. companies was to use so-called "hybrid" entities that are foreign branches of CFCs according to U.S. tax law, but that are separate companies according to the tax laws of the host countries. Income can be shifted between CFCs and such hybrid entities in ways that can escape the subpart F related party rules. The recently established "check-the-box" regulations facilitate such hybrid operations by often allowing a U.S. company to elect whether a controlled foreign entity is to be considered a branch or a separate company for U.S. tax purposes. Details of hybrid operations and of the role of the checkthe-box regulations are provided in U.S. Department of Treasury (forthcoming). 4 I consider only global welfare consequences of these policies. Recent discussions of the national welfare consequences of the U.S. deferral policy are provided by Hines (1999b ), Altschuler (2000 , and U.S. Department of Treasury (forthcoming). 5 As will be explained below, though, this does not imply that equal taxes necessarily will provide the greatest total pretax income to the owners of the capital.
factors. Musgrave (1969) made an early modification to allow saving to respond to the after-tax rate of return, but her analysis was largely overlooked until presented in more formal terms by Horst (1980) . According to the modified analysis, taxes on investment income still impose an economic distortion by discouraging saving, even when they are applied according to the principle of capital export neutrality.
To take a simple example, suppose that the capital-exporting country is small, so that its investments do not influence the rate of return abroad. Under these circumstances, the after-tax rate of return to the investors in the capital-exporting country, and hence their incentive to save, is influenced by the total rate of tax on income from foreign investment (T), including the taxes in the home and host countries, but not by the tax rate on income from domestic investment (t), whereas any distortion in the investment location decision (any difference between equilibrium pretax rates of return on domestic and foreign investment) arises from the difference between T and t. As long as investment income is taxed, it generally is impossible to avoid both the location and saving distortions simultaneously. In this example, investment location decisions are not distorted if t = T, but the saving decision is distorted so long as T > 0. If (as Horst assumes) t is arbitrarily fixed, then there is a trade-off between the two distortions, since reducing T below t distorts investment location decisions but reduces the saving distortion. In this case, the theory of second best suggests that the capitalexporting country should accept some of both distortions by structuring its taxes so that T < t in order to minimize the overall welfare loss caused by both distortions.
Horst's analysis has been criticized on grounds that it ignores the government's revenue constraint (see, for example, U.S. Congress, 1991) .
Some of his basic conclusions are only slightly altered, however, if instead of minimizing the welfare loss caused by investment income taxes for a given level of t, the problem is posed as one of minimizing this loss holding constant the total amount of government revenue collected from the investment income taxes in both the capital-exporting and capitalimporting countries combined. For example, Mackie and Rousslang (1999) show that in this case the small capitalexporting country should still structure its taxes to ensure that T ≤ t; that is, that domestic investment income is taxed at least as heavily as foreign investment income.
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Adding Other (Non-Capital) Factor Income Taxes A more telling criticism of Horst's analysis is that it ignores other factor income taxes. Keen and Piekkola (1997) demonstrated that if all factor income taxes can be varied freely and the countries cooperate to maximize the global welfare, then capital export neutrality reemerges as the proper rule for guiding tax policy.
7 To see how introducing non-capital factor income taxes changes the analysis, consider a simple example in which a single global tax authority collects all tax revenue on behalf of the countries, imposes tax on investment income at source without regard for the location of savers (so that, in equilibrium, all savers receive the same after-tax rate of return), and wants to structure taxes to raise a given amount of revenue while imposing the smallest global welfare cost.
Suppose first that only investment income can be taxed and begin with a uniform tax rate for all such income. Then, unless the global supply of capital is fixed, the same revenue can be raised with a smaller global welfare cost by reducing marginally the tax rate in a country where investment demand is more elastic and making up the revenue loss by increasing the tax rate in a country where investment demand is less elastic.
8 That is, the welfare loss imposed by distorting the investment location decision is more than offset by the welfare gain from reducing the adverse effect of the tax on saving and global investment. If non-capital factor incomes are also taxed, however, the above-described tax changes may no longer produce a welfare gain. For the same elasticity of the capital supply curve, the local, immobile non-capital factors pay a higher portion of the tax on investment income and capital pays a lower portion in countries where the investment demand is less elastic. Thus, it becomes harder to raise total tax revenue by raising the tax rate on investment income in these countries, because (all else equal) more of the gain in revenue from the tax on investment income is offset by a loss in revenue from taxes on non-capital factor incomes. Keen and Piekkola (1997) show that if non-capital factor incomes are taxed optimally, then nothing is gained by taxing investment income in different countries at different rates; such a strategy merely distorts investment location decisions without reducing the saving distortion.
Intuitively, this result might be expected. For any given capital stock, the policy of capital export neutrality yields the greatest global income. If income is greatest, then governments should be able to raise the needed revenue with the lowest income tax rates, and hence the smallest distortions in economic decisions, including the saving decision. Why doesn't a similar logic apply if only income of capital is taxed? The reason is that capital export neutrality does not necessarily provide the greatest global pretax income to capital. For example, beginning from capital export neutrality, global pretax income of capital rises if the tax rate on investment income is raised in a country where investment demand is less elastic than that in the other countries, or is reduced in a country where this demand is more elastic than that in the other countries.
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Keen and Piekkola (1997) considered only optimal tax solutions when countries cooperate to maximize the global welfare. Razin and Sadka (1991) found that if countries do not cooperate, but instead each one seeks to maximize only its own national welfare, they will also adopt a system of residence-based taxation that ensures capital-export neutrality will hold, so long as no country is large enough to influence global rates of return and each can vary freely the tax rates on all factor incomes. In particular, capital-importing countries will refrain from taxing foreign (inward) investment income and capital exporting countries will tax all investment income of local residents at the same rate regardless of the source of the income. They also find that given the countries' revenue requirements this system maximizes the global welfare. Mackie and Rousslang (1999) examine the case of a small capital-exporting country that acts unilaterally to maximize the global welfare subject to its own separate budget constraint and that takes as given the tax rates in the capital-importing countries. They find that in this case capital export neutrality maximizes the global welfare only if the capital-importing countries forego taxing the inward investment income and non-capital factor income tax rates can be varied freely. If the capital-importing countries tax the inward investment income and tax rates on non-capital factor incomes cannot be varied freely, then the optimal solution may involve setting T > t or T < t. If the capital-exporting country can tax noncapital factor incomes optimally, then it should structure its taxes to ensure that T ≥ t, that is, that foreign investment income is taxed at least as heavily as domestic investment income. This last conclusion is the opposite of that reached for the case where countries cooperate to maximize global welfare and only investment income is taxed, which yields the condition T ≤ t at the optimum. The reason is that the trade-off between raising tax revenue and distorting the investment location decision is different. For example, beginning from a position of capital-export neutrality, global tax revenue rises if the small capital-exporting country raises t, holding T constant, when only investment income is taxed, but tax revenue in the capital-exporting country falls with the same tax change if other factor incomes are taxed optimally.
Adding Corporate and Non-Corporate Sectors
Each of the analyses considered so far has assumed that there is only one form of capital investment, when in fact there are different forms of investment that may be taxed at different rates. Of particular importance for analyzing the optimal tax policy toward corporate investment is the fact that countries often tax corporate income twice: once when it is earned by the corporation and again when the income is distributed as dividends to individual shareholders or realized as capital gains.
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Reducing the tax rate on corporate income from either domestic or foreign investment alone would reduce this tax discrimination, but would distort corporate investment choices in favor of the lowertaxed investment location. Thus, the primary question is really whether the corporate income tax rate should be reduced in order to reduce the discrimination against corporate investment, rather than whether income from domestic or foreign corporate investment should be taxed at a higher rate. In particular, there does not appear to be any very compelling reason to believe that a tax bias in favor of noncorporate investment, by itself, should cause the capital-exporting country to structure its taxes to favor either domestic or foreign investment income of its corporations. Hines (1996) has argued, however, that U.S. companies with foreign earnings pay higher dividends, because shareholders are more skeptical of foreign earnings. Assuming the shareholder skepticism is unwarranted, the double layer of tax on corporate earnings penalizes companies with foreign earnings more than those with strictly domestic earnings. Hines (1999b) suggests that this fact increases the attractiveness of providing deferral for the corporate income tax on foreign earnings. However, companies may also be able to dispel shareholder skepticism about foreign earnings by repatriating the earnings 11 Under the so-called "new view," however, the individual-level tax on dividends does not affect the cost of capital for corporate investments financed from retained earnings, so it does not serve to discourage corporate investment of this type versus non-corporate investment. (See the discussion in U.S. Department of Treasury, 1992, pp. 116-8.) and paying the U.S. residual tax. If so, then the fact that they choose the higher dividend payments would indicate that the tax disadvantage of this strategy is outweighed by the tax advantage of deferral. Perhaps a more important way that adding corporate and non-corporate forms of investment alters the analysis of the optimal taxation of international investment income is to increase the need to take account of responses of the supply of capital to tax changes. In a model with homogeneous capital and only one form of capital investment, the capital supply response derives solely from the response of saving to changes in the after-tax rate of return, so it is likely to be small (see, for example, Hall, 1988; and Elmendorf, 1996) . If the analysis is used to draw conclusions about the optimal taxation of corporate international investment income, however, it must be remembered that capital can come to the corporate sector not only from saving, but also from the non-corporate sector, and hence that the supply of capital to the corporate sector is likely to be substantially more responsive to taxes than is the overall supply of capital to all sectors.
Adding Portfolio Capital Mobility
Frisch (1990) has argued that if portfolio investment is highly mobile, then the capital-exporting country should set a lower tax rate on foreign investment income that local companies derive from investments in low-tax foreign host countries, since investors in the capital-exporting country can avoid the local corporate income tax by investing directly in equities of foreign corporations. If equities of the corporations are highly substitutable, a higher corporate income tax rate applied to income from direct foreign investment by corporations resident in the capitalexporting country would sometimes cause these corporations to lose equity capital to less efficient foreign competitors, presumably reducing global welfare by causing an inefficient allocation of resources. 12 It is unlikely that portfolio investment is perfectly mobile or that residents in the capital-exporting country can always find close foreign substitutes for domestic corporate equities.
13 Even setting this issue aside, however, Grubert and Mutti (1995) show that Frisch's conclusion only follows under certain conditions. They use a model in which portfolio capital is perfectly mobile internationally, but they allow U.S. and foreign-based corporations to produce different goods that are not perfect substitutes. In the model, reducing the tax on foreign investment income of U.S.-based corporations reduces the price of their foreign output relative to their domestic output and relative to the foreign output of foreign-based corporations. Taking as given the tax rate on investment income of the foreign-based corporations, the optimal U.S. tax rates on income from foreign and domestic investments of the U.S.-based corporations depend on the substitutability among the various outputs. Grubert and Mutti find that, under reasonable assumptions about such substitutability, there is little reason to believe that the best policy would be for the United States to tax income from foreign investment more lightly than income from domestic investment.
Adding Externalities from Research and Development
Hufbauer (1992) argued that the opportunity for foreign investment allowed companies to gain a greater return from research and development (R&D). Hence, a policy that encouraged foreign investment would also encourage greater R&D, with attendant positive externalities. Grubert and Mutti (1995) note, however, that if the goal is to promote more R&D, this can be done more effectively and efficiently with a direct subsidy to that activity. Hufbauer offered no evidence that positive externalities from R&D merit a greater tax advantage than this form of investment already enjoys over investment in tangible assets.
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Adding Two-Way Capital Flows
None of the analyses cited above accounts for the substantial two-way flows of international corporate investments that are actually observed.
15 Presumably, such flows occur because there are important differences between outputs of various corporations and even between outputs of the same corporation in different countries. The introduction of such imperfect substitutability among outputs, by itself, should do little to alter the optimal tax strategy when countries can cooperate to maximize the global welfare. For the most part, one can merely replace a unique investment demand in each country with a unique investment demand facing output of each corporation in each country.
New analytical paradigms are also possible in such a world, however, that are impossible in a world in which capital is homogeneous or in which there are only one-way capital flows. As one example, one can depict a world in which aggregate investment in each country is fixed (saving does not respond to the rate of return and net international investment is zero for each country), but in which individual corporations nevertheless undertake foreign investments. In this case, if each country takes as given the tax rate on local investment in other countries, foregoing any taxes on income from outward investment may be the best policy if the goal is to maximize the global welfare. This result is not novel, since it also occurs under equally draconic assumptions in other models. For example, exemption is the optimal policy in Horst's (1980) model when investment demand is fixed in the capital-exporting country and the saving supply is fixed in the capital-importing country.
16
Application to the United States
The economics literature shows that when the goal is to maximize the global welfare, the answer to the question of whether a capital-exporting country should structure its taxes to favor domestic investment or foreign investment of its corporations depends on factors such as whether countries are able to tax income other than corporate earnings optimally and whether or not they cooperate when designing their tax structures. In the cur-14 In addition to the special tax credit for eligible R&D expenditures, investment in R&D generally can be expensed immediately, whereas investment in tangible assets must be amortized. 15 Slemrod, Hansen, and Procter (1997) provide an analysis with two-way capital flows and show that a capitalimporting country may find it beneficial to subsidize foreign investment if it cannot adjust tax rates on income from inward investment and if the foreign host country taxes income from inward investment at a rate lower than the rate it applies to domestic investment of its own residents. They do not examine global welfare consequences, however. 16 The assumption that net international investment flows are constrained to sum to zero is not necessarily less plausible than the assumption that investment demand or saving supply is fixed. For example, Summers (1986) has suggested that net foreign investment may be constrained, even if there are substantial gross investment flows, if countries routinely take actions to prevent current account imbalances. However, if the new paradigm is applied to determine the optimal taxation of income from corporate investment, and if the constraint on net foreign investment still allows substitution between corporate and non-corporate investments (as suggested, for example, by Ruffin and Rassekh, 1986) , then the optimal tax solution no longer calls for exempting the foreign earnings.
rent situation, there is little reason to believe that the United States should structure its taxes to favor either type of investment. In this sense, although it appears seldom to give exactly the right answer, the prescription of capital export neutrality derived from the early, basic economic analysis has withstood the test of time. The current U.S. tax structure does not follow the principle of capital export neutrality, because the U.S. tax on active foreign earnings can be deferred indefinitely and the foreign tax rates generally are lower than the U.S. tax on domestic investment income. For example, in 1996 (the latest year for which we have the relevant data) the average effective host country tax rate faced by U.S. manufacturing subsidiaries abroad was only 21 percent, whereas the average effective tax rate on domestic corporate income that year was about 31 percent.
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This simple comparison of average effective tax rates does not prove that the current U.S. tax structure distorts the investment location decision to favor foreign over domestic investment, but it is reasonable to conclude that such is the case.
18 One objection to using the simple comparison to draw such an inference is that it is the marginal effective tax rate on investment, rather than the average effective income tax rate, that generally determines the effect of taxes on investment decisions. 19 However, the average effective tax rates probably provide a good indication of the effect of taxes on investment location decisions and a number of researchers have used them to explain this effect.
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A second objection to the simple comparison is that the host country taxes are not the only taxes imposed on the foreign investment earnings, because the earnings often incur additional taxes (often called "repatriation taxes"), composed of withholding taxes of the host country and the residual U.S. tax, when the CFC pays dividends to the U.S. parent. However, withholding taxes typically add somewhat less than 5 percent to the total foreign tax on earnings underlying repatriated dividends 21 and the residual U.S. tax often is small. Altshuler and Newlon (1993) found that in 1986 the average U.S. tax rate on all foreign source income of non-financial companies (which includes foreign-source interest and royalties in addition to foreign earnings) was only about 3.4 percent. Grubert and Mutti (1995 and estimate that the average effective rate of U.S. tax on active foreign earnings underlying dividends of non-financial CFCs actually is negative.
There is also good reason to question whether the repatriation taxes have much influence on investment location decisions, even when the investment is in the form of a new equity injec-tion.
22 Weichenrieder (1996) points out that the repatriation tax has no effect on the investment location decision if the company can match the rate of return available in the home country while keeping the earnings abroad. Weichenrieder considered only the case where the foreign subsidiary invests in passive assets, but Altshuler and Grubert (1996) expanded this argument to include other ways that the parent company can avoid the repatriation tax without having the earnings trapped in the foreign subsidiary. For example, they point out that the U.S. parent can have the foreign subsidiary invest its earnings in passive assets abroad and then borrow against these assets at home. Finally, in recent empirical work, Grubert and Mutti (1999) find that although the host country tax rate influences investment location decisions, the withholding tax rate and the residual U.S. tax seem to have no influence on these decisions.
A pure policy of capital export neutrality would require that the United States rebate some of the host country's tax on foreign investment income if the host country's tax rate is higher than the U.S. tax rate. Such a policy provides adverse incentives to foreign host countries, however, so it is not generally followed. 23 It is sometimes suggested that since the pure policy cannot be followed, the principle should be jettisoned in favor of keeping the deferral. The deferral not only distorts investment choices in favor of low-tax countries, however, it also tends to exacerbate the tax disadvantage of the hightax countries in attracting capital. This is true, because each company can crosscredit (that is, combine income and foreign tax credits from earnings in high-tax countries and low-tax countries), so that it is able to claim credit for all of its foreign taxes unless the average of the foreign tax rates it faces is higher than the U.S. tax rate. For example, with crosscrediting and no deferral, a company with investments concentrated in low-tax countries would have an incentive to take advantage of higher pretax rates of return in countries with tax rates higher than the U.S. rate, since the company effectively would face only the U.S. tax rate on its investments in the high-tax countries. Allowing deferral of the U.S. tax removes much of this incentive.
CONCLUSIONS
There appears to be little reason to believe that U.S. taxes on international investment income of corporations should be structured to favor either domestic or foreign investment if the goal is to maximize the global welfare. Yet, owing to the policy of deferring the U.S. tax on active corporate foreign earnings, the current U.S. tax structure tends to favor foreign over domestic investment, and the bias is uneven among foreign investments because foreign host country tax rates vary widely. Hence, it appears likely that a policy change that would even out the tax rates on investment income of U.S. corporations, particularly one that would raise the tax rate on such income earned in countries with the lowest tax rates, would improve the global allocation of investment and increase global pretax income.
22 Hartman (1985) demonstrated that the repatriation taxes should not affect the decision on whether to repatriate foreign earnings or retain them abroad, but Sinn (1993) and show that the ability to defer the home-country tax can reduce the amount of the initial foreign investment in a low-tax country, because the company will rely more on retained earnings and less on the initial equity injection to reach the target level of operations. Grubert (1998) shows that the repatriation decision is broader than choosing between dividends and retained earnings, since the parent company has alternative ways besides dividend payments of receiving income from its foreign subsidiaries. 23 Certain provisions in the U.S. tax code supply just such a rebate, however. One such provision (the rules for sourcing export income) is described in Rousslang (1994) .
One cannot conclude from this, however, that the new tax planning strategies used by U.S. companies to reduce their foreign taxes have worsened the global allocation of capital, because the strategies may not have affected foreign tax rates evenly. For example, if the strategies reduced tax rates only in high-tax foreign countries and the main result was to allow these countries to attract capital away from low-tax countries, then the strategies might have improved the global allocation of capital. The assessment of the effects of these strategies is beyond the scope of the present paper.
